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NOTE
ILLEGAL DRUGS, NEW LAWS, AND JUSTICE: AN
EXAMINATION OF FIVE RECENTLY ENACTED
MINNESOTA STATUTES
INTRODUCTION
This Note is about illegal drugs, new laws, and justice. A useful
starting point is the restatement of a simple truth: state government,
in the exercise of its inherent police power, may enact rules and laws
for the purpose of governing certain types of individual conduct.
Such laws are especially legitimate when they are intended to curb
behavior that poses a serious threat to the health and welfare of soci-
ety. Throughout the nation, recent increases in the sale and use of
illegal drugs are perceived by many citizens to be one such threat to
the welfare of American society. In Minnesota, part of the govern-
mental response to this threat has been the passage of new civil and
criminal laws.
These laws are generally designed to accomplish two things. First,
the new laws often increase existing penalties, or impose altogether
new penalties, for certain types of drug-related behavior. Second,
these laws reduce the amount of proof the police require in order to
justify an arrest, and correspondingly reduce-and in one case, elim-
inate-the prosecutor's burden of proof in court. As a consequence,
suspected drug offenders now face a dramatically increased risk of
arrest and punishment.
There may be problems with this state of affairs. One problem
may lie in the true scope of the drug problem. In recent years, the
national and local media have unleashed a barrage of coverage on
the drug problem, with particular focus on the effects of cocaine and
"crack" cocaine. As of late, the question has begun to emerge as to
whether this coverage has been responsible for making the drug
problem appear larger than it really is.I One need not diminish the
1. See, e.g., Nightline: "Pack Journalism ". Horde Copy (ABC television broadcast,
Sept. 27, 1989) (transcript on file at the William Mitchell Law Review Office). On
this broadcast, news correspondent Jeff Greenfield questioned whether the media
have accurately portrayed the true scope of the drug problem and the alleged rise in
crime associated with drugs: "If drugs have triggered a sudden, huge surge in crime,
why are national murder and robbery rates down in the last two years? Why were
there fewer burglaries in New York and Los Angeles last year than there were back in
1980?" Id. at 3. Greenfield also noted that 163 drug-related stories were broadcast
over a two week span on the three major network newscasts alone. Id.
See also Minnesotans' Use of Drugs Below Average, St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch,
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fact that there is a serious drug problem in order to hold out hope
that important changes in the law will be based on the most solid and
reliable information available, and that possible media exaggerations
will not be unduly influential.
Another problem may lie in the potential of these new laws to
bring about results that are unjust. This Note will examine the pros-
pects for injustice that exist within two categories of new Minnesota
drug laws. The first of these categories can be accurately labeled
"inference-based" laws. Statutory inferences and presumptions per-
mit the prosecutor to take one step back from the need to submit
direct proof of a crime.2 Under these laws, the prosecutor may prove
one fact which is then legislatively presumed or inferred to be proof
of the existence of another fact. The presumed or inferred fact is in
turn proof that a crime was committed. This Note will attempt to
show how easily such presumptions may prove erroneous and, as a
consequence, how easily innocent persons may be hurt.
The second category of new drug laws perhaps should not be
called a category at all. The laws addressed here have little in com-
mon except for one principal feature: they may easily set forth pun-
ishments that are entirely out of proportion to the crime committed.
As will be shown, one of the two new statutes discussed here poten-
tially holds out the punishment of thirty years in prison for the mere
speaking of certain words.
The five new Minnesota statutes discussed in this Note are: (A)
Inference-Based Statutes: (1) Permissive Inference of Knowing Posses-
Nov. 22, 1989, at 1, col. 1. Survey data provided by Minnesota Human Services De-
partment indicates illegal drug use less widespread than in 1973 when last survey was
taken. (State officials released preliminary data early because of the "great public
concern" about drugs.)
Information mailed to this writer by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Appre-
hension shows the following number of narcotics (all types) arrests in Minnesota:







Office Memorandum from Kathy Frawley, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehen-
sion, to Phil Leavenworth (Sept. 15, 1989). While there has been an upward trend in
arrests, it does not appear to be the type of trend that would be proper to describe as
"dramatic" or "skyrocketing." Also, if the Human Services Department's data is cor-
rect, drug use is down, possibly meaning that increases in arrests are not related to
increased demand for illegal drugs.
2. For a good general discussion of presumptions and inferences, see Soules,
Presumptions in Criminal Cases, 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 277 (1968).
[Vol. 16
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sion, Minnesota Statutes section 152.028; (2) Forfeiture of Property
Associated with Controlled Substances, Minnesota Statutes section
609.5314, subdivision 1; (3) Possession of Controlled Substances,
Minnesota Statutes sections 152.021-.025; (B) Punishment-Issue Stat-
utes: (4) the definition of "sell" in Minnesota Statutes section 152.01,
subdivision 15a; (5) Murder in the Third Degree, Minnesota Statutes
section 609.195, subdivision b.
I. INFERENCE-BASED STATUTES
A. Minnesota Statutes Section 152.028 and Permissive Inference of
Knowing Possession
When a person is arrested and the police find an illegal drug in
that person's pocket or purse, the police and prosecutor have a rela-
tively easy burden with respect to proving that the person possessed
the drug. The illegal drug is first presented in court as evidence
along with the test results to show that it is in fact an illegal drug.
The arresting officer then takes the witness stand, describes the
arrest, and testifies as to where the drugs were found. Typically, the
officer's testimony is accepted by the jury as true and, absent some
credible and exonerating explanation by the defendant, the defend-
ant will likely be convicted for the crime of possession. The situation
can be much different, however, when a search warrant is executed,
drugs are found on a table in plain view, and six or seven people are
in the room. Who possessed the drugs, all of the persons present?
Prior to August 1, 1989, arrests and prosecutions under these cir-
cumstances proceeded under a "constructive possession" doctrine.3
In State v. Florine,4 the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that
in order to prove constructive possession [of an illegal drug not
found on the defendant's person] the state should have to show (a)
that the police found the substance in a place under defendant's
exclusive control to which other people did not normally have ac-
cess, or (b) that, if police found it in a place to which others had
access, there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence)
that defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion
and control over it.5
Police and prosecutors proceeding under this doctrine faced the pos-
sibility of a substantial and cumbersome task of evidence gathering.
3. This doctrine permits convictions
where the state cannot prove actual or physical possession at the time of
arrest but where the inference is strong that the defendant at one time phys-
ically possessed the substance and did not abandon his possessory interest
in the substance but rather continued to exercise dominion and control over
it up to the time of arrest.
State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 104-05, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975).
4. 303 Minn. 103, 226 N.W.2d 609 (1975).
5. Id. at 105, 226 N.W.2d at 611.
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Consider, for instance, a hypothetical police raid where nine people
are found inside a room with illegal drugs in view. All nine will al-
most certainly deny possessing the drugs. In order to establish
which of the people should be charged with the crime of possession,
the police might consider: whether any of the persons present is the
owner or lessee of the premises; whether any of the persons pos-
sessed drug paraphernalia or equipment known to be related to drug
activity (e.g., glass tubes, radio controlled telephone pagers);
whether any of the persons appeared to be under the influence of
drugs; and the explanation of each person for being on the premises.
Certainly, there could be other evidence indicating who possessed
the drugs.
On August 1, 1989, a new law designed to ease the police and
prosecutor's burden of proof in the constructive possession situation
became effective. The new law creates a permissive inference of
knowing possession of illegal drugs. Minnesota Statutes section
152.028, subdivision 1, states:
The presence of a controlled substance in open view in a room,
other than a public place, under circumstances evincing an intent
by one or more of the persons present to unlawfully ... prepare for
sale the controlled substance permits the factfinder to infer know-
ing possession of the controlled substance by each person in close
proximity to the controlled substance when the controlled sub-
stance was found.6
What advantage have police and prosecutors gained with the pas-
sage of this law? One way of answering this question is to look at
some of the testimony heard by Minnesota legislators when passage
of the new law was under consideration. One witness in favor of the
new law testified before a House committee as follows:
Witness: When [the police] go in and they execute a search war-
rant and they find drugs in plain view in a room, under circum-
stances showing that those drugs were packaged or those drugs
were otherwise being prepared for sale, it makes sense that all the
people sitting around the table were involved in that packaging, in
that distribution in some way. 7
Sometime later, this dialogue took place between the chair of the
committee and the same witness:
Chairwoman: But if I were visiting someone and didn't know they
were or were not a drug user and sat down at their table, the drugs
were nearest me. And, you know, I'm the innocent friend of their
mother's, you know, I go in and visit my friend's son, daughter be-
6. MINN. STAT. § 152.028, subd. 1 (Supp. 1989).
7. Statements of Jim Kamin, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, before the
Criminal Justice Division of the Minnesota House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 24,
1989 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference Library).
[Vol. 16
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cause of the old family ties, I could be then implicated because I
was close to the drugs?
Unknown voice: Book 'em, Danno.
All: Laughter.
Witness: Madam Chair, the answer is yes, the answer is yes. And
the reason for that, and the reason that law enforcement I think
would say this makes sense, is because the situation that you've de-
scribed, although in this setting perhaps makes sense, in reality
does not occur very often.8
Several interesting points can be drawn from these remarks. First,
there is a strong indication from this kind of talk that the legislators
and sponsors of the new law believed the police would gain new
arrest powers from it. Presumably, the police were to be relieved of
the need to conduct a burdensome inquiry to determine which per-
sons in a room exercised dominion and control over the illegal drugs
in plain view. The new law is directed at persons found in "close
proximity" to illegally possessed drugs-and "close proximity"
would be the new criteria for arrest. 9 If the drugs are visible in a
room, and there are people in the room, then, "Book 'em Danno."
But do the police really have new authority to arrest with the pas-
sage of this law? Under both the state and federal constitutions, po-
lice may make arrests only when there is probable cause to believe a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested com-
mitted it.10 The assessment of probable cause is a judgment-based
8. Statements of Representative Kathleen Vellenga, Chair of the Criminal Jus-
tice Division, andJim Kamin, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, before the Crimi-
nal Justice Division of the Minnesota House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 24, 1989
(tape on file at the Legislative Reference Library).
9. The new inference also refers to circumstances where the controlled sub-
stance is being prepared for sale. In many cases, this is unlikely to be a meaningful
guide for determining when the statute will apply. The fact that a controlled sub-
stance is packaged in a certain way is often used by law enforcement personnel to
infer preparation for sale. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text (House wit-
ness reference to packaging). The problem here is that drugs which are sold in pack-
ages must necessarily be purchased in packages. When a person who has purchased
(and not prepared) drugs in packages places the packages on a table, and the police
then encounter that person and his unwitting friends during a search of the room,
the police are likely to believe the "preparation for sale" portion of the statute has
been satisfied, simply because of the packaging.
10. Both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution, state:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Although "probable cause" in the amendments modifies the issuance of war-
rants, the requirements and protections of probable cause have been extended to
1990]
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• assessment, taking into account all circumstances and facts known to
the officer on the scene.I A person's presence in a room with drugs
in view is but a part of the constellation of facts that may exist to
establish probable cause to believe a person committed the crime of
illegal possession of a controlled substance. An arrest pursuant only
to the statutorily designated facts may be constitutionally invalid if
the exercise of totality of the circumstances judgment would not
have established probable cause.' 2
Of even greater concern than the potentially unclear standards for
arrests is the prospect that innocent persons might be convicted
under the new inference. As the committee dialogue above indi-
cates, the legislators did not have difficulty imagining situations
where a person might be on the scene of illegal drug activity and yet
not be involved in that activity. Recall that the witness' answer to
this problem was that such situations "in reality do[ ] not occur very
often." Whether future "reality" bears that statement out or not, it
is clear that the prospect of arresting and charging innocent persons
too often can make a law unconstitutional.
In State v. Mercherson,13 the Minnesota Court of Appeals had before
it a Minneapolis city ordinance which declared, in part, that:
"[n]o person shall .. .visit ... any building or place with knowl-
edge that.. . the unlawful use, sale or keeping for sale of any [ille-
gal] drug ... occurs therein. Evidence of the general reputation of
such a building or place as one where any of the foregoing occurs
warrantless searches and seizures as well. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 102 (1959) ("if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental search, it
must be made with probable cause"); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)
(in exigent circumstances, judgment of the police as to probable cause serves as suffi-
cient authorization for a search).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that the probable cause necessary to
arrest is " 'a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing the accused to be
guilty' " of a crime. State v. Sorenson, 270 Minn. 186, 196, 134 N.W.2d 115, 122-23
(1965) (quoting Garske v. United States, 1 F.2d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 1924)).
11. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in the context of determining the presence
or absence of probable cause, has noted that:
[e]ach case, however, must be decided on its own facts and circumstances
and is not subject to some set formula as a guide by which to judge the
reasonableness of the arrest in issue. The question to be answered is
whether an officer in the particular circumstances, conditioned by his obser-
vations and information, and guided by the whole of his police experience,
reasonably could have believed that a crime had been committed by the per-
son to be arrested.
Sorenson, 270 Minn. at 196, 134 N.W.2d at 123 (citations omitted).
12. It is highly doubtful the Minnesota appellate courts will ever hold that reali-
zation of the statutorily designated circumstances is alone sufficient to establish prob-
able cause. Such a holding would apparently conflict with the Sorenson court's
objection to a "set formula." See supra note 11.
13. 438 N.W.2d 707 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
(Vol. 16
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shall be prima facie evidence of such knowledge.' 14
The court of appeals ruled that this ordinance "infringes on a sub-
stantial amount of constitutionally protected activity" and was there-
fore so overbroad as to deny due process of law to those arrested
under it.t5 The court's decision is consistent with other case law
holdings that declare a statute is overbroad when legal, constitution-
ally protected activities are criminalized as well as illegal, unpro-
tected activities;'6 or, when the legislature sets a web large enough to
catch all possible offenders and leaves it to the courts to determine
who is being lawfully detained and who should be set free. 17
The new inference of knowing drug possession bears some resem-
blance to the ordinance found unconstitutional in Mercherson. Each
sets forth some specific feature of geography (with the new inference
it is a room, in the ordinance it was a building or "place") and links
the specified location together with presumably provable illegal drug
activity. Persons then found present within the location may be in-
ferred (or there is a prima facie conclusion) to have some culpable
purpose or knowledge.
Defense lawyers may soon accuse the new inference of essentially
being the old ordinance in sheep's clothing. A likely central issue in
such a challenge will be whether the new inference, like the ordi-
nance, infringes on too much constitutionally protected activity and
therefore is overbroad. Such a challenge might again bring into
question the kinds of activities and associations protected by the
constitution.
As the chair of the legislative committee illustrated in her example,
innocent persons who have not possessed drugs can be expected to
enter dwellings where illegal drug activity is taking place. They may
be unwitting family visitors or they may enter the dwelling on busi-
ness, as for instance where a postal employee or plumber enters the
home. If the visitor's timing is wrong and a raid is conducted while
the visitor is present, then the statute technically permits the infer-
ence that the visitor possessed drugs, providing there are drugs in
open view.
Consider a more difficult example. A mother knows that her son is
involved in illegal activity and she knows that by going to visit him
14. Id. at 708 (quoting Minneapolis Code of Ordinances § 385.170 (1976)).
15. Id. at 709.
16. See, e.g., Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 (1987) ("those [statutes] that
make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be
held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate applications").
17. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) ("It would certainly be
dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offend-
ers, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained,
and who should be set at large.").
1990]
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she will place herself in proximity to illicit drugs. Nevertheless, she
is compelled by her love for her son to make the visit. When the
police raid the home, she is aware that cocaine is resting on a table in
the room in which she is seated. Is her circumstance the type of in-
nocent association worthy of constitutional protection? Like a postal
employee or plumber, she has never possessed a controlled sub-
stance and yet the terms of the new inference appear to authorize
government action against her.
In opposition to the "too wide a net" challenge that defense law-
yers may make, police and prosecutors may defend the new law on
several grounds. First, they may emphasize the fact that the infer-
ence focuses on the activity taking place within a single room. Thus
the operation of the inference is narrowly confined, unlike the
Mercherson ordinance which placed an entire building within its
scope.' 8 Second, they would note that the inference is by its very
title permissive. There is no intention that it be brought to bear on the
innocent visitor. The permissive nature of the new law, together
with the prudent exercise of police and prosecutorial discretion, can
be relied on to prevent unjust arrests and prosecutions. Taken to-
gether, these assertions may persuade an appellate court that the
new inference is not as overbroad as the Mercherson ordinance and
should therefore pass constitutional muster.
It is appropriate at this point to examine a final important aspect
of the new inference-the effect of the inference at trial in a court of
law. At trial, the new inference of knowing possession is intended to
show up in the form of ajury instruction. Prior to jury deliberations,
the prosecutor may request that an instruction be given that tracks
the example presented by the House committee witness:
Witness: And, so what this presumption says, or this inference is,
it says to a jury, when we get to that point, "ladies and gentlemen
of the jury, you may infer that, if you find that the drugs were in
[proximity to the defendants, you may] infer that [each person]
knew something about those drugs and had some sort of interest in
those drugs, and you may, you're not required, but you may con-
vict them of possession of those drugs."' 9
18. It is true that the new inference is ostensibly concerned with what occurs
within a single room. However, the law goes on to say that persons found in "close
proximity" to the drugs are the persons who may be inferred to have possessed the
drugs. "Close proximity" simply means "closely near." Proximity is defined as "next
or very near," WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1828 (1971), which
is to say, it means whatever anyone wants it to mean. This potent ambiguity could
conceivably be exploited by an officer who wished to arrest someone who was, say, a
block away from the drugs. The block-long distance would be "closely near" enough
for that officer.
19. Statements of Jim Kamin, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, before the
Criminal Justice Division of the Minnesota House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 24,
[Vol. 16
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The drafters of the new inference were wisely aware that infer-
ences or presumptions which direct or require the jury to make certain
findings or conclusions are seldom constitutional.20 If an instruction
along the lines suggested by the witness is given, and the permissive
nature of the inference is thereby made clear to the jury, then the
drafters may have successfully avoided one due process problem.
However, the new inference as jury instruction is vulnerable to an-
other due process challenge. Besides the fact that inferences must
be permissive, they must also be consistent with the criminal reason-
able doubt standard. In Barnes v. United States,2' the United States
Supreme Court stated that "if a statutory inference submitted to the
jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies the reasonable doubt
standard (that is, the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is
sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a rea-
sonable doubt)... then it clearly accords with due process."
2 2
This reasonable doubt issue can best be understood by consider-
ing two laws, one real and the other fictional. The first law, the real
one, prohibits a person from possessing heroin that the person
knows has been imported into the country. The law contains a per-
missive inference which allows ajury to infer (from the proved fact of
possession) the fact that the person knew the heroin was imported.
The second law, fictional, declares that drunk driving is a crime. The
law contains a permissive inference which allows ajury to infer that a
person who is stopped by police, and who exhibits slurred speech, is
drunk.
The issue should now be clear. Since the beyond a reasonable
1989 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference Library). The witness was describing a
jury instruction which might be given for another permissive inference under consid-
eration. That inference permitted the factfinder to infer a person possessed drugs
when the person was found inside a motor vehicle that contained drugs. A version of
this motor vehicle inference was enacted at Minnesota Statutes section 152.028, sub-
division 2. It is fair to predict that the jury instruction that will be given with the
"room" inference will look very much like the motor vehicle instruction described by
the witness. The brackets in the quote replace the witness' references to the motor
vehicle situation.
20. For a discussion of the constitutionality of mandatory inferences, see State v.
Kelly, 218 Minn. 247, 264, 15 N.W.2d 554, 563 (1944) (mandatory inference of crim-
inal intent to sell alcohol upon proof of possession of alcohol held unconstitutional).
See also State v. Edwards, 269 Minn. 343, 349-50, 130 N.W.2d 623, 626-27 (1964)
(mandatory inference of intent to use burglar tools upon proof of possession of those
tools held unconstitutional). Cf State v. LaForge, 347 N.W.2d 247, 252-56 (Minn.
1984) (because trial court's wording of jury instruction may have impermissibly
shifted burden of proof to defendant, reversible error was found). The main concern
about mandatory presumptions and inferences is that traditional principles such as
the prosecutor's burden of proof and the defendant's presumption of innocence are
jeopardized. See Edwards at 348, 130 N.W.2d at 626.
21. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
22. Id. at 843.
1990]
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doubt standard is of constitutional dimension,23 a statutory inference
should not be able to suggest to a jury that it may convict a defend-
ant upon proof of the statutorily designated facts if those facts are
insufficient for a rational jury to also find the defendant guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
In Turner v. United States,24 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered the heroin law described above. Knowledge of the importa-
tion of the drug was an essential element of the crime.25 The
Supreme Court held that the permissive inference in that case did
not offend the reasonable doubt standard.26 Opium poppy is
not indigenous to the United States so the inference may be made
that any persons who possess heroin know that the heroin was
imported.27
The permissive inference in the fictional law is obviously out of
synch with the reasonable doubt standard. A person with slurred
speech might simply have a speech impediment. The proved fact of
slurred speech leaves a substantial doubt whether the person was
drunk, hence the denial of due process if such an inference is read to
the jury in the form of an instruction.
How might Minnesota's new inference of knowing drug possession
fare under a challenge on this issue?28 Prosecutors defending the
inference will gain strong support from the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decision in Lopez v. Cury.29 In Lopez, the court of ap-
peals had before it a New York law similar to Minnesota's new law.
23. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged").
24. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
25. Id. at 405.
26. Id. at 416.
27. Or, as the Court stated, "To possess heroin is to possess imported heroin."
Id.
28. The Minnesota Supreme Court has dealt with the inference/reasonable-
doubt issue on at least one occasion. In State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 1977),
the court had before it a challenge to the accuracy of a blood-testing kit which was
furnished and administered by state agencies to test blood alcohol levels in motor-
ists. The court declared that state involvement in furnishing the kit created a pre-
sumption that the contents of the kit were not contaminated. The court stated,
"Since state provision of the blood-testing kit would be sufficient for a rational juror
to find the presumed inference beyond a reasonable doubt, the requirements of due
process have been satisfied." Id. at 568-69 n.2 (citing Barnes v. United States, 412
U.S. 837 (1973)).
29. Lopez v. Curry, 583 F.2d 1188 (2d Cir. 1978). Of the major cases dealing
with inferences, Lopez is particularly relevant to the subject of this Note because the
case involved a statutory inference of drug possession. Supporters of Minnesota's
new inference will also gain support from Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140
(1979). Ulster dealt with a statutory inference of firearms possession. The permissive
nature of the inference in that case was heavily emphasized by the Court as justifica-
[Vol. 16
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The New York statute declared that the presence of illegal drugs in
an automobile "is presumptive evidence of knowing possession
thereof by each and every person in the automobile at the time such
controlled substance was found."30 At trial, this presumption mate-
rialized in the form of a jury instruction. The prosecutor and trial
judge made it clear to the jury that the prosecutor's burden of proof
under the presumption amounted to just this-the prosecutor need
only prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was (1) a car, (2)
people in it, and (3) drugs in the car.3 ' On this much, the jury could
(and did) convict.3 2 The Second Circuit, on writ of habeas corpus,
concluded that the proved facts of a car, people, and drugs satisfied
the reasonable doubt standard, thus permitting New York juries to
convict defendants for possession of illegal drugs on those facts
alone.aS
The good news for defense lawyers is that Lopez, besides being
only persuasive in Minnesota, is not a well reasoned case. The Lopez
court indirectly acknowledged that it "can and does in fact occasion-
ally happen" that innocent persons will be found in cars with
drugs.34 This sounds very much like the acknowledgement of the
witness before the Minnesota House committee that innocent per-
sons will be found in rooms with drugs in open view (although not
"very often"). In spite of the implicit admission that innocent per-
sons may be snared by the New York inference, the Second Circuit in
tion for its holding that the inference satisfied the reasonable doubt standard. See id
at 163-67.
At least one important distinction can be made between the Ulster inference and
permissive inferences of drug possession: persons found in proximity to firearms
almost certainly will recognize them as being firearms, thus creating a much stronger
inference of possession. The same cannot be said when persons are found in prox-
imity to illegal drugs since plain white powders, for instance, are much less recogniz-
able as being drugs. Thus, there is a greater likelihood that persons in proximity to
illegal drugs will be ignorant of the contraband in their midst. To this significant
extent then Minnesota's new inference is less rational than the inference under con-
sideration in Ulster.
30. Lopez, 583 F.2d at 1189 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAw § 220.25(1)).
31. Lopez, 583 F.2d at 1190.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1192.
34. Id. at 1191 (quoting report of Temporary State Commission to Evaluate the
Drug Laws, a New York commission). The New York commission, in its report, re-
jected the possibility
"that persons transporting dealership quantities of contraband are likely to
go driving around with innocent friends or that they are likely to pick up
strangers. We do not doubt that this can and does in fact occasionally hap-
pen, but because we find it more reasonable to believe that the bare pres-
ence in the vehicle is culpable, we think it reasonable to presume culpability
in the direction which the proven facts already point."
Id. at 1191-92 (quoting report of Temporary State Commission to Evaluate the Drug
Laws, a New York commission).
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Lopez declared, with little analysis, that the inference accorded with
the reasonable doubt standard. 3 5 Where the freedom of innocent
persons may be at stake, blank declarations are particularly unsatis-
factory. Minnesota courts should give this important issue the
greater attention it deserves.
It is appropriate to close this examination of Minnesota's new in-
ference with an observation from the Washington Supreme Court.
In City of Seattle v. Ross,36 the Washington court had before it an ordi-
nance which contained an irrebuttable presumption that a person
found in proximity to a place where narcotics were located was guilty
of narcotics trafficking. While there are apparent differences be-
tween the Seattle ordinance and the Minnesota inference, the words
of the court with respect to the potential for injustice are on point.
The court stated:
If every person found in comparative proximity to illegally kept
narcotics . . . were arrested, fined and imprisoned, no doubt the
municipal authorities could feel assured that a considerable
number of persons engaged in the traffic of narcotics would meet
their just punishment. By the same token, if every child in a city
beset with a problem of juvenile delinquency were confined in an
institution, that problem would be eliminated. The Chinese, we
are told, for a long time held the firm conviction that the only way
to roast a pig was to put it in the family home and burn it. Both
they and we, it is hoped, have long since learned that, with industry
and the exercise of the imagination and reason, the prize can be
had without the sacrifice.3 7
Police and prosecutors face a real and difficult evidence problem
in the constructive possession situation. Where the police find a
group of persons wandering around a room with drugs in view, it is
hard to sort out those who may be innocent from those who may be
guilty. But this is not a good reason to rely on a law that may cast its
net over everybody, leaving the innocent to fend for themselves in a
time consuming, expensive, and confusing criminal justice system.
Minnesota's old doctrine of dominion and control at least had the
virtue of requiring that convictions be based on all the cold, hard
facts the authorities could assemble. There can be no better protec-
tion for the innocent.
The new inference should be either repealed by the legislature or
declared unconstitutional. Short of this, the following measures
should be taken:
1. Law enforcement authorities in the field should be reminded
35. See Lopez, 583 F.2d at 1191 n.7.
36. 54 Wash. 2d 655, 344 P.2d 216 (1959).
37. Id. at 661, 344 P.2d at 220.
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often that probable cause, and not the statutorily designated facts, is
the standard for arrest.
2. Defense lawyers should seek to have any jury instruction modi-
fied along the lines of the instruction that appears in the Minnesota
case of State v. Ferraro.3 8 That instruction read:
Possession of property recently stolen, if not satisfactorily ex-
plained [or if falsely explained], is ordinarily a circumstance from
which the jury may reasonabl[y] draw the inference and find, in the
light of surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the
case, that the person in possession knew the property had been
stolen.39
Such an instruction tempers the impact of the inference, reminding
the jury that it should consider the defendant's explanation, if one is
given, and that it should rely on the statutory inference only when
the surrounding facts are also consistent with guilt.
3. The defense lawyer might also consider requesting an instruc-
tion along these lines:
Although the State is entitled to the benefit of a permissive
inference in this case, remember that a verdict of guilty may
only be returned upon your finding that the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In accord with City of Seattle v. Ross, the family home may well be afire
in Minnesota, the decision having been made to roast the pig. De-
fense lawyers must be alert to the issues and rescue the innocent.
B. Minnesota Statutes Section 609.5314, Subdivision 1, and Forfeiture of
Property Associated with Controlled Substances
Recall from the previous section that the question was raised
whether the new statutory inference of knowing possession intro-
duced some confusion into proper arrest standards. The issue was
whether the arrest standards suggested by the statutory inference
were consistent with the totality of circumstances basis of probable
cause. This is also an issue with respect to the constitutionality of
another Minnesota statute.
Minnesota Statutes section 609.5314, subdivision 1, declares that
"all money, precious metals, and precious stones found in proximity
to... controlled substances" are "presumed to be subject to admin-
istrative forfeiture."40 There is a presumption, in this case rebutta-
ble,41 that valuable property found in proximity to illegal drugs is
38. 290 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 1980).
39. Id. at 179.
40. MINN. STAT. § 609.5314, subd. l(a) (Supp. 1989).
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criminally associated with those drugs, as profits or otherwise.42
As will be shown, the fourth amendment has been held to apply to
all forfeiture actions, whether civil or criminal. This being the case,
the question again arises as to whether the authority given police and
prosecutors upon the realization of limited circumstances described
by statute (i.e., seizure and forfeitures of valuables upon finding the
valuables in proximity to controlled substances) is consistent with
the totality of circumstances basis of probable cause.
To understand how Minnesota's forfeiture statute operates, con-
sider the hypothetical case ofJohn and Susan. John and Susan met a
few weeks ago and John mentioned to Susan that if she ever wanted
to buy some cocaine she should talk to him. Two weeks later, Susan
and John meet at the parking lot of a local supermarket and Susan
brings fifty dollars with her to make the buy. Unfortunately for both
of them, the police have received a tip that the sale is taking place,
and undercover police officers arrest John and Susan. John is
charged with selling a controlled substance and Susan is charged
with possession.
When John is arrested, the police seize, pursuant to Minnesota
Statutes section 609.5314, subdivision 1, several items ofjewelry on
his person, a coffee can full of jewelry in his automobile, and $1700
cash. The police also seize a few items of jewelry that Susan was
wearing and, in addition to the fifty dollars she used to purchase the
drugs, $150 that Susan set aside for her rent.
When John and Susan are released on bail, each is given a receipt
for the property that has been taken.43 The receipt states that the
property is subject to forfeiture and if an action for return is not
commenced within sixty days, they will lose all right to the prop-
42. Minnesota Statutes section 609.5314, subdivision l(a), refers only to a pre-
sumption of forfeitability; the presumed association with controlled substances is not
explicitly stated. MINN. STAT. § 609.5314, subd. 1(a) (Supp. 1989). To see the asso-
ciation, two other provisions must be consulted. Minnesota Statutes section 609.531,
subdivision 6a, declares that the agency handling the forfeiture bears the burden of
proving the act that gave rise to the forfeiture. MINN. STAT. § 609.531, subd. 6a
(Supp. 1989). One of the acts the agency must prove is described in Minnesota Stat-
utes section 609.5311, subdivision 2, where authority for the forfeiture of property
associated with controlled substances is set forth. MINN. STAT. § 609.5311, subd. 2
(Supp. 1989). Returning now to Minnesota Statutes section 609.531, subdivision 6a,
an exception to the agency's burden of proof is provided by awarding the agency the
presumption of forfeitability set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 609.5314, the
statute with which this Note is concerned. MINN. STAT. § 609.5314, subd. 1 (a) (Supp.
1989). Thus, the presumption of forfeitability is a presumption that property nearby
controlled substances is associated with those substances.
43. A person whose property is subjected to forfeiture does indeed receive a re-
ceipt; they are handed out in order to comply with notice requirements set forth in
Minnesota Statutes section 609.5314, subdivision 2.
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erty.44 John hires a lawyer who promptly commences an action for
return of the property.4 5 Susan does not understand the law as
wel146 and after sixty days has done nothing to get her property
back.47
The seizure and forfeiture of Susan's jewelry, property that had no
connection to criminal activity, is unjust. John, on the other hand,
seems to have received his just desserts: he is a drug dealer and his
dealings have been profitable.
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.5314, seizures similar
to those described in the example may be taking place in Minne-
sota.4 8 The reasoning behind these seizures can be expressed in this
way: We do not permit captured bank robbers to retain possession of
stolen cash, so why permit the local drug dealer to retain the profits
from his or her criminal activity? And are not valuable items found
near illegal drugs likely to represent those profits?49 Also, why not
attack the spread of drugs from the economic, as well as the criminal,
end? After word of enough seizures and forfeitures gets around, the
44. See MINN. STAT. § 609.5314, subd. 3(a) (Supp. 1989).
45. John can obviously afford the filing fee for a civil action. The civil filing fee in
Hennepin County, Minnesota is presently $88. An indigent claimant may proceed in
forma pauperis; however, it is not known how many persons simply abandon their
claims because they are unaware that they may proceed for free.
46. If Susan immigrated to the United States, her inability to understand the law
as explained on the receipt could stem from a limited ability with the English lan-
guage. There is adequate space on the forfeiture receipt to include short advice-of-
rights paragraphs in several of the minority languages spoken in Minnesota. This
simple step, however, has not been taken.
47. Even if Susan had commenced an action a day or two after the seizure of her
property, it would have been some time before she could receive her property. The
commencement of an action only entitles the claimant to an assignment on the court
docket. The assigned date may be months away. The property is retained by the
state during this time.
48. See, e.g., Attorneys Say Property Seizure Law in Drug Cases Violates Civil Liberties, St.
Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, Dec. 26, 1989, at IA, col. 1 [hereinafter Property Seizure].
This article discusses allegations that innocent property is being seized pursuant to
the forfeiture presumption and specifically details (1) an allegation that a woman's
mortgage money was seized, leading to foreclosure of her real property and (2) an
allegation that the seizure of a welder's paycheck reduced the welder to living in the
streets and in shelters. There is acknowledgement in the article, by both prosecutors
and defense attorneys, that actual profits from illegal drug activity are also being
successfully seized under the new law.
49. The author of the forfeiture law, James Appleby, an Assistant Hennepin
County Attorney, states that the presumption is needed because, during police raids,
occupants of "crack" houses deny that drugs and drug equipment are theirs. Property
Seizure, supra note 48, at 6A, col. 1. By denying that the drugs are theirs, the occu-
pants apparently attempt to disassociate their cash and valuables from connection
with the surrounding drug activity. The presumption of association is therefore
needed to overcome those denials.
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economic incentive to enter the drug trade may be reduced.50
In the case of criminals such as John, this reasoning has achieved
the right result. The presumption that property found near drugs
represents profits or is otherwise associated with those drugs has
matched reality in his case. Also, from this experience John and
other dealers who know about John's case may now have second
thoughts about the easy life of a drug dealer.
In the case of persons such as Susan, this reasoning has just as
plainly achieved the wrong result. The presumption that property
found near drugs will represent profits has not matched reality. With
respect to stopping the spread in the use of drugs, Susan, to be sure,
is going to think twice about buying drugs in the future. However,
this effect probably was accomplished by her arrest and charge of
possession. The loss of her jewelry and rent money has probably
only inspired in her a hatred for the legal system.
It would seem that the central question in all of this would reduce
to: How can the right result be preserved and the wrong one be
avoided when section 609.5314, subdivision 1, is applied to a given
case? As will be shown, the answer ought to lie in the fourth amend-
ment requirement of probable cause.
Both the state and federal constitutions prohibit the government
from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures.51 When prop-
erty is taken pursuant to a forfeiture statute, it would seem that a
"seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment has taken
place and that probable cause and the test of reasonableness should
therefore apply.
The Supreme Court's holding in Boyd v. United States52 reinforces
this conclusion. In Boyd, the Court had before it a civil forfeiture
action which the government had commenced against an importer of
plate glass.53 The allegation was that the property was forfeitable
50. See MINN. STAT. § 609.531, subd. la(3) (Supp. 1989) (forfeiture laws to be
construed to promote purpose of reducing economic incentive to engage in criminal
enterprise); MINN. STAT. § 609.531, subd. la(4) (Supp. 1989) (forfeiture laws to be
construed to promote purpose of increasing pecuniary loss resulting from detection
of criminal activity).
The author of Minnesota's forfeiture presumption has stated that "another goal
is to take drug-buying money out of the hands of users." Property Seizure, supra note
48, at 6A, col. 1. While it is conceivable that the state in some case might assemble
convincing evidence of a person's future intent with respect to her money (for exam-
ple, a known drug dealer shows up at wholesale drug distribution enterprise with a
suitcase full of cash), those cases would seem to be rare. Beyond that exception, just
how the state could presume to know a person's future intentions with respect to his
or her money is anyone's guess.
51. See supra note 10. For convenience, this Note will now refer only to the fed-
eral conistitutional provisions that apply.
52. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
53. See id. at 617-18.
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because the importer had illegally avoided paying import duties. 54
The Court examined the character of the forfeiture action and
stated, "We are.., of the opinion that proceedings instituted for the
purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of
offense committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in
their nature criminal."55 The Court went on to state the law: "As,
therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commis-
sion of offenses against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we
think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all
purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution ....56
At this point, it should be noted that Minnesota's forfeiture
scheme is also civil in form. 57 The actions are in rem actions against
the property,5 8 the fiction being that the property itself has commit-
ted an offense against the state.59 Since the state enjoys the pre-
sumption that the property is forfeitable, the owner has the initial
burden of rebutting the presumption by producing evidence in court
showing the property had innocent origins and is therefore legal to
possess.60 If the owner successfully rebuts the presumption the state
may still attempt to prove an association between the property and
crime by clear and convincing evidence.6 1
Whatever a state's procedural structure for forfeitures may be, the
Boyd Court made it plain that civil versus criminal distinctions are
irrelevant where the fourth amendment is concerned. 62 Although
there has clearly been a retreat from Boyd's "quasi-criminal" charac-
terization of forfeiture actions, and although there has been a corre-
sponding reluctance to expand the full run of criminal constitutional
rights to those actions,6S the United States Supreme Court has never
54. Id.
55. Id. at 633-34.
56. Id. at 634.
57. See MINN. STAT. § 609.531, subd. 6a (Supp. 1989) (legislative declaration of
civil form).
58. See id.
59. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-88
(1974) (discussing historical development of fiction that property, in forfeiture pro-
ceedings, may be conceived of as having committed an offense against the state).
60. See MINN. STAT. § 609.5314, subd. l(b) (Supp. 1989) (claimant bears burden
to rebut the presumption); MINN. STAT. § 609.5314, subd. 3(b) (Supp. 1989) (claim-
ant as plaintiff must specify grounds on which plaintiff alleges property was improp-
erly seized). The author has personally observed that many claimants attempt to
produce receipts or pay stubs as evidence the property is not associated with illegal
drugs. The author has also observed that claimants often do not keep the necessary
documentation.
61. See MINN. STAT. § 609.531, subd. 6a (Supp. 1989) (state's burden of proof is
set at clear and convincing standard).
62. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
63. See generally State v. Spooner, 520 So. 2d 336, 356-59 (La. 1988) (Cole, J.,
concurring). Justice Cole's thorough review of constitutional considerations in for-
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retreated from Boyd's treatment of the fourth amendment. In fact,
the Court in a later case reaffirmed the applicability of the fourth
amendment to civil forfeiture actions. 64 In short, the fourth amend-
ment application to forfeiture actions is the current the law.
The Boyd case, however, did not deal with the specific issue of
probable cause in the context of forfeiture.6 5 Thus, the Supreme
Court did not (and apparently never has) explicitly stated that for
property to seized and subject to forfeiture there must be probable
cause to believe the property is associated with criminal activity.
Many federal66 and state6 7 court decisions, however, have since ac-
knowledged that law enforcement authorities must establish a prob-
able cause "nexus" between the property and crime before seizures
and forfeiture may commence. Also, unlike Minnesota's enactment,
feiture actions is unique and highly recommended reading. Justice Cole's main
theme is that the United States Supreme Court has examined civil forfeiture proceed-
ings to see whether a feature of the process has become sufficiently criminal in nature
to warrant the extension of a criminal constitutional protection. Depending on the
nature of the procedural feature in question, the Court has extended some protec-
tions but not others.
64. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). In Plym-
outh, the Court had before it an automobile seizure and forfeiture case where the
application of the exclusionary rule was in question. The Court noted that "[t]here is
nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile. It is only the alleged
use to which this particular automobile was put that subjects [the claimant] to its
possible loss." Id. at 699. Certainly, a parallel observation could be made as to the
possession of precious stones, precious metals and money. The Plymouth Court also
reviewed the Boyd decision and made note of the "authoritative statement and the
holding by the Court in Boyd that the Government could not seize evidence in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment for use in a forfeiture proceeding .... 9 Id. at 698.
65. The fourth amendment issue in Boyd had to do with compelling a person to
produce papers which would then be introduced as evidence against that person in a
forfeiture action. In addition to being a violation of the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination, the process of compulsion was held to be an unreasonable
seizure under the fourth amendment. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-35.
66. See, e.g., United States v. $38,600 in United States Currency, 784 F.2d 694,
697-98 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing forfeiture probable cause threshold); United
States v. Miscellaneous Jewelry, 667 F. Supp. 232, 237-38 (D. Md. 1987) (govern-
ment must initially demonstrate a probable cause for a substantial connection be-
tween seized property and criminal acts). See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West 1981
& Supp. 1989) (cases are discussed in annotation notes on probable cause in forfei-
ture actions).
67. See, e.g., Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288, 290 (Alaska 1985) (property seizeable
upon showing of probable cause); In re Approximately Forty-Eight Thousand Nine
Hundred Dollars, 432 So. 2d 1382, 1385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (burden on gov-
ernment to show probable cause in forfeiture action); Lowery v. Nelson, 43 Wash.
App. 747, 751, 719 P.2d 594, 596 (1986), app. dism'd, 479 U.S. 1024 (1987) (under
facts, sufficient untainted evidence to support probable cause to seize and forfeit);
Fuqua v. Armour, 543 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tenn. 1976) (Drug Control Act authorizing
forfeiture upon showing of probable cause is constitutional; however, the unlawful
seizure did not prevent subsequent forfeiture for Drug Control Law); Reed v. State,
460 So. 2d 115, 119 (Miss. 1984) (probable cause shown authorizing forfeiture).
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Congress included an explicit probable cause requirement when it
passed the forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act.68 Many state forfeiture provisions are
modeled on the federal act and likewise contain a probable cause
requirement. 69
Consider the following discussions of the relationship between
probable cause and forfeiture. In United States v. $22,287.00,70 the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained: "The probable cause
that the government must show is: 'a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt, supported by less than prima facia proof but [requiring] more
than mere suspicion. In making its probable cause showing, how-
ever, the government must also establish a nexus between the prop-
erty to be forfeited and the criminal activity defined by statute.' "71
The Texas Supreme Court, in much the same vein, stated:
In forfeiture proceedings, the burden is on the state to show prob-
able cause for seizing a person's property. Probable cause in the
context of forfeiture statutes is a reasonable belief that a "substan-
tial connection exists between the property to be forfeited and the
criminal activity defined by statute." It is that link, or nexus, be-
tween the property to be forfeited and the statutorily defined crimi-
nal activity that establishes probable cause, without which the State
68. The Act is codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1988). The forfeiture/probable
cause requirements appear in 21 U.S.C. § 881 (b)(3-4). The author has been unable
to uncover any legislative history that directly explains Congress' decision to include
the requirement of probable cause. When the Act was passed, however, Congress
was aware of the Boyd Court's application of the fourth amendment to forfeiture ac-
tions. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4566, 4655 (discussing Boyd, fourth amendment, and exclu-
sionary rule).
In 1978, Congress amended the Act to expand upon the types of drug-associated
property which can be seized and forfeited. In its Joint Explanatory Statement of
Titles II and III, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9518, 9522, legis-
lators made the following comment: "Due to the penal nature of forfeiture statutes, it
is the intent of these provisions that property would be forfeited only if there is a
substantial connection between the property and the underlying criminal activity
which the statute seeks to prevent."
From these materials, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that Congress
inserted the probable cause requirement in order to comply with the fourth amend-
ment and because Congress believed it was proper and fair to condition seizures and
forfeitures on a finding of probable cause.
69. The Uniform Controlled Substances Act, virtually identical to the federal
Act, contains the requirement of probable cause for forfeiture and has been enacted
in many states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 20-2-93 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2 para.
1655 '(Smith-Hurd 1955); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.43 (Anderson 1987); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 161.55 (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-7-1049 (1988).
70. 709 F.2d 442 (1983) (citations omitted) (currency was seized in plaintiff's
house and on his person after a narcotics sale by the plaintiff to undercover police
officer).
71. Id. at 446-47 (citations omitted).
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lacks authority to seize a person's property.72
These pronouncements hopefully have clarified the role of prob-
able cause in the forfeiture context. Due to the Boyd Court's firm and
enduring application of the fourth amendment to forfeiture actions
(for all purposes), and the subsequent applications of probable cause
by the courts, Congress, and state legislatures, the probable cause
requirement would seem to be unassailably in place as the law with
respect to forfeitures.
In view with what has just been said, it may be surprising to learn
that at least one Minnesota district court judge has observed that
"the laws relating to forfeiture as set forth in Minn. Stat. 609.531 and
609.5314 do not require a showing of probable cause." 73 It is also
surprising to learn that the Minnesota Court of Appeals has ex-
pressed some uncertainty as to whether probable cause is a require-
ment in state forfeiture proceedings.74
The probable cause/forfeiture issue remains to be decided in Min-
nesota. At this point, it is appropriate to examine how probable
cause ought to operate when law enforcement authorities seize prop-
erty and subject it to forfeiture. Recall what has been stated else-
72. Fifty-Six Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars in United States Currency v.
State, 730 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1987) (citations omitted).
73. Order and Memorandum ofJudge Steven Z. Lange at 6, Walker v. $737.00 in
United States Currency, No. 89-00772 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin County, Minn. Aug. 9,
1989). The order denied plaintiff's motion to have Minnesota Statutes section
609.5314, subdivision 1, ruled unconstitutional as violating the fourth amendment
requirement of probable cause. Id. at 2.
74. See State v. Valento, 405 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). The forfeiture
issue before the court was a procedural issue under the old pre-August 1988 laws.
The court held that the trial court's order of forfeiture must be reversed because the
forfeiture was accomplished in contravention of the laws as they were then written.
In the course of that reversal, the court added the following interesting dicta: "More-
over, at least under the federal forfeiture statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1615, the burden of
proof is on the government to show probable cause for the institution of a forfeiture
suit. Here there has been no showing whatsoever that the $892 found on Valento
was received from sales of narcotics." Id. at 921 (citations omitted).
From this much, it appears the probable cause issue was not briefed for the
court, hence the words "at least," words which seem to indicate some uncertainty as
to whether Minnesota's forfeiture laws also require a showing of probable cause. It is
encouraging, however, to note that the court found it appropriate to apply probable
cause analysis to the forfeiture case before it.
It should also be noted that the Michigan Court of Appeals has squarely ruled
that Michigan's presumption statute, similar to Minnesota's, does not require a show-
ing of probable cause. See People v. United States Currency $4,082, 404 N.W.2d 634,
636 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). This decision was based on a reading of the applicable
statutes and two state cases where the issues were off point. There is no fourth
amendment analysis (the entire probable cause issue is dealt with in two paragraphs)
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where about the nature of probable cause. 75 Probable cause is a
judgment-based assessment, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances. 76 How might the forfeiture presumption in section
609.5314 conflict with the probable cause requirement? Returning
to the example ofJohn and Susan and their arrest in the parking lot,
assume the police did not exercise any probable cause judgment
when they seized property. All they knew or cared about was the
statute authorizing the seizure of valuables found in proximity to
controlled substances, the very situation they had encountered.
What probable cause assessment could they have made?
In John's case, the officers could have noted that John was ob-
served in the act of selling an illegal drug. From this the police could
logically conclude that John is engaged in criminal enterprise for
profit. Also, he was carrying an unusually high dollar amount of
property, particularly the cash that might indicate recent involve-
ment in other drug transactions. The coffee can full of jewelry is
highly suspicious. The indication is that John is bartering drugs for
non-cash valuables. Based on these facts, the police would certainly
have been justified in finding a probable cause nexus between John's
property and criminal activity. The seizure pursuant only to the stat-
ute complies with the fourth amendment, but that compliance is for-
tuitous since the police did not apply a totality of the circumstances
analysis.
In Susan's case, the outcome is different. The police have ob-
served her in the act of purchasing a small amount of cocaine. From
this, there is not the least indication that she is anything more than a
mere user of drugs. Also, the property on her person is utterly in-
nocuous. Susan's rather ordinary jewelry does not exhibit the ap-
pearance of being the prizes of crime. The rent money is a relatively
modest amount, an amount not unlikely to be found on any person.
In Susan's case, the probable cause nexus between the property
and the crime is absent and yet, pursuant to section 609.5314, the
property is seized. Without probable cause, the seizure of her prop-
erty is constitutionally unreasonable. Hopefully, this example has il-
lustrated how Minnesota's forfeiture statute has the potential to steer
police conduct in one direction (seizure and forfeiture, carte
blanche) while the United States Constitution steers the police in an-
75. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
76. Id. For a review of case digests showing some of the factors-proximity of
property to drugs, amount of money, witness statements, confessions, informants,
etc.-which might figure in to a totality-of-circumstances assessment of probable
cause in a forfeiture action, see Annotation, Fofeuture of Money to State or Local Authori-
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other (seizure and forfeiture on the delimiting basis of probable
cause).
The legislature should repeal the presumption in section
609.5314, subdivision 1, and replace it with general authority to
seize and forfeit property where the responsible agency has probable
cause to believe the property has a substantial connection with crimi-
nal activity. Such a grant of authority gives police and prosecutors
all the power they need to seize the prizes of crime that are likely to
be found in proximity to illegal drugs. The beneficial side-effect of
such a grant is that the police will approach seizure situations with
the responsibility to exercise mature and intelligent judgment, as op-
posed to the present practice of making seizure determinations on
the basis of a mechanical statutory "broom." This is a result that
accords not only with the Constitution, but also accords with our
sense of right and fairness. If the legislature fails to act, the appellate
courts of Minnesota should rule that Minnesota Statutes section
609.5314, subdivision 1, is unconstitutional as permitting violations
of fourth amendment rights.
It is appropriate to conclude with a quote from the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v. $38,000.77 That
court, in the course of dismissing a government forfeiture action,
summed up the situation this way: "A forfeiture complaint must al-
lege sufficient facts to provide a reasonable belief that the property is
subject to forfeiture: in particular, that the government has probable
cause to believe that a substantial connection exists between the
property to be forfeited and the exchange of a controlled sub-
stance."78 The court then added:
[W]e are not unsympathetic to the government's strong desire to
eradicate drug trafficking: we recognize that illegal drugs pose a
tremendous threat to the integrity of our system of government.
We must not forget, however, that at the core of this system lies the
Constitution with its guarantee of individuals' rights. We cannot
permit these rights to become fatalities of the government's war on
drugs. 79
Whatever action is taken, the requirement of probable cause in
forfeiture actions should be firmly recognized. By restoring prob-
able cause to its proper role, we restore at least some minimal pro-
tection for innocent property, the loss of which can be devastating in
ways we can only imagine. By restoring the probable cause require-
ment to its proper role, we ensure that a precious individual right
will not become a fatality to the war on drugs in Minnesota.
77. 816 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1987).
78. Id. at 1548.
79. Id. at 1548-49.
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C. Possession of Controlled Substances in the First Through Fifth Degree-
Minnesota Statutes Sections 152.021-. 025
Prior to August 1, 1989, Minnesota's controlled substances laws
focused on three types of criminal conduct: possession of illegal
drugs; selling illegal drugs; and possession of illegal drugs with the
intent to sell. 8 0 The latter law might apply in a situation where
weighing scales, drug manufacturing equipment, and large quantities
of drugs were found at the scene of a drug raid, but no actual sale of
drugs was observed by the police. Both the quantity of drugs and
the other materials found at the scene indicate that the drugs were
possessed for the purpose of distribution for profit, rather than for
personal consumption. In this situation, prosecutors could not
charge the offenders with the crime of sale; and the relatively moder-
ate five-year penalty set forth in the possession law seemed
inadequate.8 1
The possession with intent to sell charge filled the gap, permitting
prosecutors to charge these persons with a crime that set forth the
same severe twenty-year penalty as the sale law.82 The jury was then
confronted with two fact questions when a case came to trial: the fact
of possession and the fact of intent to sell. 83
The passage of a new five-tiered statutory scheme by the Minne-
sota Legislature in 1989 radically changed the way these crimes are
charged. Minnesota Statutes sections 152.021 through 152.025 now
set forth five degrees of sale crimes 84 and five degrees of possession
crimes.85 The crime of possession with intent to sell has vanished,
except in cases where small amounts of drugs are involved. The
question this Note will attempt to answer is: What happened to the
crime of possession with intent to sell?
At the outset, an examination of some of the basic operational fea-
80. Minnesota Statutes section 152.09, prohibiting the manufacture, possession,
and sale of certain drugs was repealed effective August 1, 1989. MINN. STAT.
§ 152.09, repealed by 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 290, art. 3, §§ 37, 38.
81. Minnesota Statutes section 152.15, subdivision 2, setting forth penalties of
up to five years imprisonment for possession crimes was repealed effective August 1,
1989. MINN. STAT. § 152.15, subd. 2, repealed by 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 290, art. 3,
§§ 37, 38.
82. Minnesota Statutes section 152.15, subdivision 1, setting forth penalties of
up to 20 years imprisonment for first offense sale crimes and first offense intent to
sell crimes, was repealed effective August 1, 1989. MINN. STAT. § 152.15, subd. 1,
repealed by 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 290, art. 3, §§ 37, 38.
83. Note also that the crime of possession was a lesser included offense of pos-
session with intent to sell. If the state proved possession, but failed to prove intent to
sell, the defendant was still guilty of the less severe charge of possession.
84. See MINN. STAT. §§ 152.021, subd. 1; 152.022, subd. 1; 152.023, subd. 1;
152.024, subd. 1; 152.025, subd. 1 (Supp. 1989).
85. See MINN. STAT. §§ 152.021, subd. 2; 152.022, subd. 2; 152.023, subd. 2;
152.024, subd. 2; 152.025, subd. 2 (Supp. 1989).
1990]
23
Leavenworth: Illegal Drugs, New Laws, and Justice: An Examination of Five Rece
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
tures of the new five-tiered possession scheme is helpful. The new
laws create the crimes of possession in the first through the fifth de-
gree. Beginning, at the low end, with the crime of fifth degree pos-
session, the punishment authorized by each succeeding degree
escalates in severity. The primary distinction between degrees is the
amount of controlled substance that the person apprehended
possessed.86
Examples of the "amount" distinction between each degree are
shown in the following two charts.87 The first chart illustrates how
the possession of "crack" cocaine is now treated at each degree.88
The second chart illustrates how the possession of powder cocaine is
treated at each degree.89
CRACK COCAINE
Degree of Penalty Authorized
Offense Amount Possessed By Statute
1st 25 grams 30 years
2nd 6 grams 25 years
3rd 3 grams 20 years
4th less than 3 grams90  15 years
less than 3 grams (mere
5th possession) 5 years
86. See id.
87. The charts are the author's simplifications of a rather wordy and complex
statutory scheme. The author believes these charts accurately represent the treat-
ments of the drugs described.
88. The word "crack" does not appear in any of the statutes. Although not de-
fined by the statute, the words "cocaine base" include "crack." See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 152.02 1, subd. 2(1) (Supp. 1989) ("cocaine base" is not defined). The words "co-
caine base" were challenged for vagueness in State v. Moore, 431 N.W.2d 565 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988). In Moore, a defendant who was alleged to have possessed crack co-
caine was charged under statutes making it a crime to possess "cocaine base" with
intent to sell. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the charge, arguing
that the use of the words "cocaine base" rendered the applicable statute void for
vagueness. In relevant part, the court held that the words "cocaine base" would
normally be understood to "mean[ ] pure cocaine in its undiluted chemical form"
(e.g., crack). Id. at 568-69.
89. The words "cocaine powder" do not appear in the statutes. Instead, the stat-
utes refer to mixtures containing narcotic drugs. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 152.021,
subd. 2(2) (Supp. 1989). "Narcotic drug" is defined to include cocaine. See MINN.
STAT. § 152.01, subd. 10(1) (1988) (narcotic drug includes extracts of coca leaves).
90. The phrase "less than" does not appear in the statutes. The reference in the
two charts to less than three grams of crack and less than 10 grams of cocaine powder
are rooted in a logical reading of the statutes. (See infra note 92 for an explanation of
why coca derivatives crack and powder cocaine are treated differently). First, second,
and third degrees are linked to specified weights of drugs, while fourth and fifth
degrees are not. Fourth and fifth degrees, however, still punish possession of
Schedule II drugs, and Schedule II includes any derivative of coca leaves. MINN.
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POWDER COCAINE 9 1
Degree of Penalty Authorized
Offense Amount Possessed By Statute
1st 500 grams 30 years
2nd 50 grams 25 years
3rd 10 grams 20 years
4th less than 10 grams 15 years
less than 10 grams (mere
5th possession) 5 years
Why would the Minnesota Legislature enact a five level structure
with punishments keyed to the amount of drug possessed? The
answer is that police and prosecutors were frustrated with the
burden of proving the intent element of the crime of possession with
intent to sell and wanted to eliminate that burden. The new five-
tiered structure provided the means to do this.
Under the new law, possessors of small amounts of drugs are
presumed to be mere users. Traditionally charged with the less
harsh crime of possession under the old law, they are now charged
with the least harsh fifth degree level under the new law. Where
other facts (scales, etc.) indicate that the possessor of a small amount
of drugs intended to sell them, the two-element crime of possession
with intent to sell remains an option in two of the lower degrees.92
STAT. § 152.02, subd. 3(l)(d) (1988). Thus, possession of coca derivative is
punishable at all five degrees. It makes sense that persons accused of possessing
"less than three" or "less than 10" grams of coca derivative (crack or powder) will be
charged at the lower degrees since only possessors of greater amounts can be
charged at the higher degrees.
91. The different treatments of possession of crack and cocaine powder may
appear confusing. Possession of 10 grams of powder is required to earn the
possession charge of third degree, while possession of only three grams of crack
earns the same charge. As each substance is a derivative of coca, one may wonder
why they are treated differently.
Crack is usually manufactured from impure cocaine powder. The goal of the
manufacturing process is to separate the impurities and thereby attain an almost pure
type of cocaine. The process is a simple one and the resulting product is extremely
potent. See generally R. GARRET, V. SERNAQUE & U. WALDMEYER, THE COKE BOOK
37-39 (1986) (discussing manufacture and use of cocaine paste). At the hearings of
the Minnesota Legislature, the participants apparently believed that crack is an
especially dangerous form of cocaine and therefore warrants special treatment.
92. See MINN. STAT. § 152.024, subd. 2(2) (Supp. 1989) (fourth degree violation
for possessing Schedule I, II, or III substances with intent to sell); MINN. STAT.
§ 152.023, subd. 2(3) (Supp. 1989) (third degree violation for possessing a narcotic
drug with intent to sell). These provisions are confusing and difficult to explain.
Powder cocaine and crack cocaine are each derivatives of coca. Derivatives of
coca qualify as both a narcotic drug (MINN. STAT. § 152.01, subd. 10(1) (1988)) and
as a Schedule II substance (MINN. STAT. § 152.02, subd. 3(l)(d) (1988)). Therefore,
a person possessing two grams of powder cocaine under circumstances
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The story gets more interesting with the first, second, and third
degrees of the crime. Possessors of "dealership" quantities of drugs
are charged here. The reasoning behind the creation of these levels
can be best understood by considering one witness' testimony before
a Minnesota House Committee:
Now, the proposed bill changes the crime [of possession] in one
way which law enforcement and prosecutors, I think, will welcome
heartily. It changes possessions of significant quantities by simply
saying, "if you possess the specified weight, you have committed
the crime." It relieves a burden on law enforcement and prosecu-
tors of showing that that possession was with the intent to sell.93
Later the same witness expanded on this statement:
As I described earlier, the possessions, all the possession crimes
that are keyed to weights now [under the proposed bill] do not
require law enforcement to prove, nor does it require the prosecu-
tor to show beyond a reasonable doubt, that those quantities were
possessed with the intent to sell. That would be an enormous ben-
efit to law enforcement.
94
The witness offered this illustration: "Presently, if you possess
three grams of crack with the intent to sell, you face a zero to twenty
year penalty. The proposed bill says if you possess three grams of
crack period, you face a zero to twenty year penalty."95
Finally, the witness offered this justification:
The rationale for that really is twofold. First, no one possesses
three grams of crack without the intent to sell. Therefore, why re-
quire prosecutors and law enforcement to prove it? Second, even
if there is the odd occasion when someone might conceivably pos-
sess that much crack, without the intent to sell, three grams of
crack is an awful lot of havoc sitting there in someone's pocket
under any circumstances and ought to be punished
appropriately. 96
demonstrating an intent to sell may be charged with either third or fourth degree
possession, depending on the whim of the prosecutor.
These intent to sell provisions are options available to the prosecutor. The
intent to sell provisions were almost certainly inserted to give prosecutors a means
of bringing possessors of "mere user" amounts of drugs up from the fifth degree to a
higher degree when the circumstances showed the possessor intended to sell the low
amount of drug involved. The main point is this: Where a possession with intent to
sell crime involves only a small amount of illegal drug, the statutes have retained the
two-element formulation of the crime. Where the amount of drug involved exceeds a
statutorily designated limit, the statutes punish more severely on the basis of amount
possessed alone.
93. Statements of Jim Kamin, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, before the
Criminal Justice Division of the Minnesota House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 24,
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The legislature apparently accepted this reasoning because it sub-
sequently enacted a version of the graduated scheme of possession
statutes promoted by the witness. The net result is that Minnesota
statutes no longer explicitly punish the independent crime of posses-
sion with intent to sell when certain levels of drugs are involved. For
first, second, and third degrees, the prosecutor need only prove pos-
session of the statutorily designated amount and the harsher penalty
is automatically meted out. At these levels, intent to sell is assumed
and is therefore omitted from the definition of the crime.
At least two lines of analysis are available to test the validity of the
legislature's action. The first of these has to do with the legislature's
inherent power to criminalize an act without reference to the actor's
intent to break the law. In State v. Kremer,97 the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated that "[i]t has long been settled that the legislature may
forbid the doing of an act and make its commission criminal without
regard to the intention, knowledge or motive of the doer."98 Thus,
the legislature has the power to eliminate intent as an element of
crimes such as statutory rape. With statutory rape, it is irrelevant
that the actor did not intend to engage in sexual activity with an un-
derage youth (i.e., mistake of age is no defense).99
A problem arises, however, when this reasoning is applied to the
new drug possession scheme. It is proper to view possession with
intent to sell as a crime that contains two elements of intent. First,
there is the initial intent to possess. A person may claim that he did
97. 262 Minn. 190, 114 N.W.2d 88 (1962).
98. Id. at 191, 114 N.W.2d at 89. In Kremer, the defendant ran a red light. At
trial, the court accepted that the defendant ran the light because the brakes on his car
were bad. This defense failed, however, because the traffic law in question made no
reference to the violator's intent or lack of intent to run the light. Thus, running the
light for any reason was sufficient for conviction. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated that while the legislature could disregard the violator's intent to break
the law, the violator must have intended the act which violated the law. Since the
defendant had no intent to perform the act, the conviction was reversed. Id. at 192,
114 N.W.2d at 89-90.
In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the United States Supreme
Court showed that there will be occasions when the legislature probably does not
have power to disregard even the intent to break the law. In Morissette, the defendant
picked up property that he thought was abandoned scrap metal. The metal turned
out to be property of the government. The theft statute made no reference to intent
so the defendant could not defend himself at trial. The Supreme Court declared that
the defendant's intent to break the law (he obviously intended to perform the act
which amounted to a violation of law) was relevant under these circumstances and
reversed the conviction. Id. at 276.
This discussion is given to acquaint the reader with the manner in which legisla-
tive power to disregard intent has traditionally been analyzed. As the text will
demonstrate, these traditional analyses are not exactly on point with the unique issue
of intent presented by the Minnesota Legislature's new possession scheme.
99. See, e.g, MINN. STAT. § 609.343, subds. 1 (a)-(b) (1988).
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not intend to break the law when the person possessed drugs, but
the legislature may rightly prohibit possession without regard to that
intent.100 The second element of intent-the intent to sell-oper-
ates as a differential between two penalties (unlike the role intent
might play in a case of statutory rape). Absent this element of intent,
the accused has only possessed drugs, and faces a lower penalty. If
the intent to sell is present-proved or assumed-then the penalty is
drastically elevated. Thus, intent itself is criminalized. The Kremer court
did not have this kind of situation in mind when it acknowledged
legislative power to disregard intent. Thus, the pronouncement in
Kremer appears to be weak support for upholding legislative power to
disregard intent when the affirmative presence of intent performs an
elevating function with respect to punishment.
The second line of analysis has to do with the concept of irrebut-
table presumption of fact. This analysis attributes to the legislature
the following reasons for enacting the first, second, and third de-
grees in the scheme: "If you, the accused, possessed a dealership
quantity of illegal drugs, i.e., a quantity so large that the possession
of it is inconsistent with a typical drug user's needs for personal use,
then you must have intended to sell or distribute those drugs to
others, and you shall be punished not only for your possession, but
also for your presumed intent to sell."101 Thus, once the fact of pos-
session is proved, the fact of intent to sell is presumed for first, sec-
ond, and third degreet02 It is irrebuttable because intent to sell is
100. There may be times, however, when the intent to do the act of possessing will
be relevant. If X attends a party and leaves his coat in a closet and later Y mistakenly
puts his drugs in the pocket of X's coat, then X will not have intended the act of
possession when he leaves the party with drugs in his pocket.
101. This attribution tracks one of the House witness' two rationales for the new
scheme, i.e., the rationale that no one will possess a certain amount of drug without
the intent to sell it. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Whether the witness'
second rationale, i.e., the "awful lot of havoc" in the pocket which deserves to be
punished accordingly, is a defensible rationale is highly doubtful.
By the witness' own premise, "havoc" cannot refer to sale or distribution. Thus,
the reference to "havoc" is probably a reference to the deleterious effect the drug
will have on the user himself, or to some notion that the user is likely to become
addicted from the high amount of drugs he possessed, and will therefore commit
crimes to meet future drug needs.
With respect to deleterious effect, Minnesota does not punish those who have
attempted suicide. Those who pose a danger only to themselves are in need of treat-
ment, not severe criminal sanction. With respect to the notion of addiction and fu-
ture crime, this justification for increased punishment is a justification based on
likelihoods. While the phenomenon of addiction and associated crime is certainly
familiar in society as a whole, the future behavior of an individual possessor of drugs
is impossible to foresee.
102. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission apparently would agree
that these levels of possession contain a presumption of intent to sell. See St. Paul
Pioneer Press Dispatch, Mar. 21, 1990, at IB, col. 6 (in course of discussion on re-
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not an element of the crime.103
Both the Minnesota Supreme Court 104 and the United States
Supreme CourttO5 have had much to say about irrebuttable pre-
lease of Commission's sentencing report and the effect of recent changes in law,
newspaper notes "[legislators also eliminated the need to prove intent to sell the
drug in many cases where a person possesses a large amount. Those with large
amounts are presumed to be dealers").
103. The concept of presumptions in graduated schemes of possession crimes was
addressed by the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v. Campbell, 320 N.W.2d 381
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982). The defendant alleged the graduated possession law de-
prived him of due process of law by conclusively presuming he had an intent to sell
the drugs he possessed. The court was uncomfortable with the concept, saying "This
is not a case, then, where one offense with a lesser punishment is elevated to a differ-
ent offense with a more severe punishment by operation of some legislative presump-
tion." But, just in case that operation was going on, the court analyzed the validity of
the presumption in two separate paragraphs. See id. at 383-84. In the Minnesota
scheme, the comments of the House witness should make it clear that the elevating
function of presumption is indeed at work.
104. In State v. Kelly, 218 Minn. 247, 15 N.W.2d 554 (1944), the Minnesota
Supreme Court stated, "Such statutes are of two general types: those creating con-
clusive presumptions of law or fact, and those creating rebuttable presumptions of
fact or 'prima facia' proof. Those of the first type have met the almost uniform fate of
being declared unconstitutional, as denying due process of law." Id. at 250, 15
N.W.2d at 557.
In Juster Bros., Inc. v. Christgau, 214 Minn. 108, 7 N.W.2d 501 (1943), a statu-
tory notice technicality prevented an employer from contesting unemployment com-
pensation obligations found due when an employee separated from the employer's
company. The effect of the technicality was to create "a presumption and an estop-
pel against the employer." Id. at 112, 7 N.W.2d at 504. The Minnesota Supreme
Court declared that
[e]ven the legislature itself does not have the power to declare what shall be
conclusive evidence contrary to the fact. "The legislature cannot in this
manner provide for the arbitrary exercise of power, so as to deprive a per-
son of his day in court to vindicate his rights. And the law which closes his
mouth absolutely when he comes into court is the same, in effect, as the law
which deprives him of his day in court."
214 Minn. at 117-18, 7 N.W.2d at 507 (citations omitted).
A statutory conclusive presumption of fact has been upheld on at least one occa-
sion. In State v. District Ct. of Hennepin County, 139 Minn. 409, 166 N.W. 772
(1918), a workman's compensation law provided "that the surviving wife 'shall be
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent' " on her deceased spouse. Id. at 411,
166 N.W. at 773. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Legislature can
make a presumption conclusive unless such presumption would cut off or impair
some right given and protected by the Constitution." Id. The court found there was
no impairment of such a right in the case before it. Id.
105. In McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 78 (1916), the Court
considered the effect of a presumption set forth in a Louisiana sugar refining statute.
The statute, among other things, declared that a refinery kept idle for more than a
year raised the presumption that the operating company was in violation of an anti-
monopoly law. Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared the
statute to be unconstitutional and stated that "it is not within the province of a legis-
lature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." Id. at 86.
In Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1928), the Court considered a statute that
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sumptions and they are clearly disfavored. Perhaps the case that best
addresses this situation, however, is a case which was not directly
concerned with the irrebuttable presumption concept at all. In the
Minnesota case of Meyer v. Berlandi,106 Justice William Mitchell con-
sidered a statute under which a material man could be imprisoned
for owing debts because his failure to pay was conclusively presumed
to be evidence of fraudulent intent. Justice Mitchell based his deci-
sion on the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
debt,107 but also indicated that there were other constitutional
grounds upon which his decision could have been based.108
Under the statute in question, wrote Justice Mitchell, if the mate-
rial man
has received his pay from the owner of the property, and owes a
debt due on a contract to one of his laborers.., which he is unable
to pay, he is guilty of obtaining money on false pretenses, and lia-
ble to imprisonment in the penitentiary. No matter how honestly
he may have paid over the last dollar which he has received on his
contract, yet if, through honest mistake, he took the job too cheap,
or if by unforeseen accident it cost more than he anticipated, and
for that reason he cannot pay all that he owes for labor or material,
he is a felon. This is returning with a vengeance to the old barba-
rous fiction upon which imprisonment for debt was originally
based, viz., that a man who owed a debt, and did not pay it, was a
trespasser against the peace and dignity of the crown, and for this
supposititious crime was liable to arrest and imprisonment. Such a
statute cannot be sustained for a moment. 0 9
Here, then, the material man has committed an initial wrong: the
failure to pay debts. Under what is in effect a statutory irrebuttable
presumption, the defendant is presumed to have committed the sec-
ond wrong of intentional fraud when he incurred the debt in the first
place. Justice Mitchell aptly described the potential injustice and de-
nial of due process inherent in such a statute-it punishes a supposi-
titious crime, and not necessarily a crime that was committed. The
new Minnesota possession statutes are likewise "supposititious" in
that they presume the possessor of drugs intended to sell them,
declared "[e]very insolvency of a bank shall be deemed fraudulent." Id. at 3-4. In
the course of declaring the statute unconstitutional, the Court stated that "[a] statute
creating a presumption that is arbitrary or that operates to deny a fair opportunity to
repel it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mere legisla-
tive fiat may not take the place of fact in the determination of issues involving life,
liberty or property." Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
106. Meyer v. Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438, 40 N.W 513 (1888).
107. Id. at 441, 40 N.W. at 514.
108. Id. ("if not unconstitutional on other grounds, [the statute] is clearly repug-
nant to section 12, art. 1, of the constitution of the state, prohibiting imprisonment
for debt").
109. Id. (emphasis added).
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although that may not have been the case." t 0
The best defense that can probably be made in favor of the new
possession statutes is that at some point the presumption of intent to
sell seems inescapably rational. One rather extreme example helps
to illustrate this point. On September 30, 1989, law enforcement
authorities in Los Angeles, California, seized twenty tons of cocaine
stockpiled in a warehouse."l' One person on the scene estimated
that the there was enough illegal cocaine to occupy the space of two
school buses.1 2 Could anyone doubt that the owners of these illegal
drugs intended to sell them?
The problem, however, is that rationality is-or ought to be-a
separate question. If the defendants in the California case are
charged with possession with intent to sell, they will earn the smirks
and skepticism of the jury if they claim that the drugs were intended
for personal use or that, for some other reason, the drugs were not
intended for sale. But the defendants would at least get the intent
issue to the jury in the first place; and although the owner of twenty
tons may have difficulty raising a credible claim of intentions of per-
sonal use, the possessor of three grams of crack may have a far more
credible claim. When the government's own experts state that
twenty-five million Americans have used cocaine and that millions
more use it every month,'ls it seems incredible to speak in terms of
the "odd occasion" when someone will possess three or more grams
of crack not for sale but for personal use. There will be a fair
number of such occasions and these persons deserve to have a jury
of their peers decide the intent to sell issue the same as juries decide
all questions of fact in criminal trials.
110. Consider an example of where the Minnesota presumption has almost cer-
tainly gone wrong. In Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970), the United
States Supreme Court had before it the case of a defendant accused of dealing in
both heroin and cocaine. The defendant possessed 14 grams of cocaine when ar-
rested. The Court expressed its opinion that "having a small quantity of a cocaine
and sugar mixture [14 grams] is itself consistent with [the defendant's] possessing
the cocaine not for sale but exclusively for his personal use." Id. at 423. Minnesota,
by singling out possessors of 10 or more grams, has reached precisely the opposite
conclusion.
Likewise, in State v. Collard, 414 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), a Duluth
police officer at trial "conceded [that] a heavy user [of cocaine] could go through five
grams in a week." Id. at 735. That officer probably would not be surprised to learn
that a heavy user had stockpiled a two-week supply. Despite the concession of per-
sonal use, the presumption of intent to sell reaches this defendant too.
I 1. See Feds Make 20-Ton Cocaine Bust, St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, Sept. 30,
1989, at IA, col. 3.
112. Id. at IA, col. 3, 5A, col. 2.
113. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG ABUSE, DRUG TRAFFICK-
ING AND ORGANIZED CRIME 16 (1986).
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The Minnesota Legislature should return the burden of proof to
the prosecution in all cases of intent to sell. Short of this, the legisla-
ture should consider permitting the defendant to raise an affirmative
defense. This would have the effect of allowing the defendant to re-
but the presumption., 14 Such a statutory defense might read: "In all
cases wherein the defendant is charged with first, second or third
degree possession, it shall be an affirmative defense, sufficient to re-
duce the charge to possession in the fifth degree, that the defendant
illegally possessed a controlled substance but did not intend to sell
or distribute it."
Such a statutory defense accomplishes several things. First, the
prosecutor is still relieved of the burden of showing intent. Upon a
showing that the defendant did in fact possess the amount of drugs
in question, it becomes the burden of the defendant to convince the
jury that his intentions were for personal use and that he had no
intentions to distribute the drugs. If he is successful, he has only
reduced his culpability, not eliminated it. He is still guilty of posses-
sion in the fifth degree, the "mere user" level of punishment. If he is
unsuccessful, he has still had the opportunity to get the intent ques-
tion to the jury, and cannot complain that he has not had his full day
in court. In either event, the possibility of punishing a person who is
innocent of intent to sell will have been largely avoided, a result
which must work to the satisfaction of all.
If the legislature fails to act, the appellate courts of Minnesota
should restore due process in the manner they deem appropriate.
II. PUNISHMENT-IssuE STATUTES
D. Minnesota Statutes Section 152. 01, Subdivision 15a, and the
Definition of "Sell"
Not surprisingly, it is against the law to sell illegal drugs in Minne-
sota. Prior to August 1, 1989, "sell" was not defined in Minnesota's
controlled substance laws. Presumably, then, "sell" was used by the
courts more or less in line with its commonly understood meaning.
However, with the passage of Minnesota Statutes section 152.01,
subdivision 15a,115 sell now means "to sell, give away, barter, de-
liver, exchange, distribute or dispose of to another; or to offer or
agree to do the same; or to manufacture."16 The most interesting
part of this new definition is the term "offer or agree." Under this
114. For a review of cases dealing with rebuttable presumptions of intent to sell,
see Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Creating Presumption or Inference of In-
tent to Sell from Possession of Specified Quantity of Illegal Drugs, 60 A.L.R. 3d 1128 (1974 &
Supp. 1989).
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language, it would appear that drug sale convictions can now be
based purely on announced intentions to obtain drugs for another.
In examining the validity of this provision, it is useful to begin with
the universally recognized principle that a person cannot be pun-
ished solely for bad thoughts. As one writer observed long ago,
"The thought of man shall not be tried, for the devil himself
knoweth not the thought of man.""t 7 But while the thoughts alone
may not be punishable, the transformation of bad thoughts into
words often is punishable. In Minnesota, for instance, some com-
mon examples can be found in the crimes of uttering terroristic
threatsl8 or the crime of perjury.119 In each case, there is an imme-
diate and identifiable harm caused by the spoken word alone.
More on point with the definition of sell, however, is the crime of
soliciting prostitution. In Minnesota, prostitution is defined to mean
"engaging or offering or agreeing to engage for hire in" sexual
acts.' 20 The Minnesota Court of Appeals has stated that "the mere
offer of sexual services is a crime."121 The court added that "the
state need only prove that the prostitute 'intentionally agreed or of-
fered to engage in sexual intercourse for hire.' "122
Since both "sell" and "prostitution" are defined to include offers
and agreements, the rationales for these crimes are probably similar.
According to one treatise, "For the crime of solicitation to be com-
pleted, it is only necessary that the actor with intent that another
person commit a crime, have enticed, advised, incited, ordered or
otherwise encouraged that person to commit a crime."123 The rec-
ognizable harm from words of solicitation therefore stems from the
fact that they induce or encourage another to commit a crime. With
prostitution, it is the encouragement of another to engage in illegal
sexual activity. With solicitation for a sale of drugs, it is the encour-
agement given to another to illegally possess a controlled substance.
There would also seem to be a "nuisance" type of harm in both of
these crimes, perhaps stemming from a view that bargaining over
proposed illicit activity, often on a public street corner, somehow im-
poses the immorality of others on the public.
In any event, there is an obvious (and perhaps somewhat amusing)
distinction that can be drawn between the two crimes. All persons of
the human race, simply by virtue of gender, possess the immediate
117. Y.B. 7 Edw. IV, f.2 (Pasch. pl. 2) (quoted as an epigraph in J. MARSHALL,
INTENTION-IN LAW AND SOCIETY xi (1968)).
118. MINN. STAT. § 609.713 (1988).
119. MINN. STAT. § 609.48 (1988).
120. MINN. STAT. § 609.321, subd. 9 (1988).
121. State v. Kelly, 379 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
122. See id. (citation omitted).
123. See 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1, at 3 (1986).
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capacity to engage in prostitution. When the offer is made, there is
little doubt that the offeror can make good on the offer. With the
offer to sell drugs, however, the capacity to perform the crime is less
obvious. Should this capacity distinction matter? As will be shown,
it probably should to some extent.
Bearing in mind that under Minnesota's definition of sell a person
who agrees to sell and a person who actually hands over drugs in
exchange for money have each committed a sale crime, it is impor-
tant to examine how sale crimes are punished. On August 1, 1989,
an entirely new drug-sale statutory scheme went into effect. There
are now five degrees of sale crimes and the degrees are generally
distinguished by the amount of the drug that was sold.124 "Crack"
cocaine, for instance, is dealt with in the following manner:
Penalty by Statute
Degree Amount Sold in Years/Fines
First ten grams 30 / $1,000,000
Second three grams 25 / $500,000
less than
Third three grams 20 / $250,000
less than
Fourth three grams 15 / $100,000
Fifth N/A N/A 125
Given this graduated structure of amounts and punishments, is it
possible that persons could be charged according to the amount they
agreed or offered to sell? There does not appear to be anything in
this scheme to prevent such charges. It seems unlikely, however,
that legislators ever intended that offers and agreements be treated
in this fashion. There are too many common sense, as well as
constitutional, objections.
For example, a serious entrapment issue is raised. Under this
scheme, undercover police officers would have an apparent incentive
to get a suspected trafficker to commit to selling large amounts of
drugs so that the trafficker would face a harsher sentence when
brought to trial. As with most entrapment scenarios, the bounds of
acceptable police conduct and the true measure of a defendant's
124. MINN. STAT. §§ 152.021, subd. 1; 152.022, subd. 1; 152.023, subd. 1;
152.024, subd. 1; 152.025, subd. 1 (Supp. 1989).
125. Like the possession charts discussed above, this chart is a simplification of a
wordy and complicated statutory scheme. The author believes the chart accurately
represents the treatment of sales of "crack" cocaine.
Prosecutions at the fifth degree are precluded because only marijuana and
Schedule IV substances (coca derivatives are not included in Schedule IV) are
addressed there. See MINN. STAT. § 152.025, subd. 1 (Supp. 1989) (fifth degree sale);
MINN. STAT. § 152.02, subd. 5(a) (Supp. 1989) (Schedule IV).
[Vol. 16
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss2/5
ILLEGAL DRUGS AND NEW LAWS
culpability both come into serious question.126
Also, given that extremely long prison sentences are at stake, it
would seem to be vitally important to know if the vendor actually can
supply large amounts of drugs. The experienced police officer might
agree that "street" behavior can be very braggadocio, and that the
person who says, "Yeah, you know I'm the guy who can get you ten
grams," may actually only be able to run and fetch a tiny fraction of
that amount, or even nothing at all. Does it make sense to severely
punish this person solely for his false and petty claim to possess
significant criminal ability?
And the vendor who has committed to the sale of ten grams of
crack-is he really more culpable than the person who has planned
and taken substantial steps toward the commission of first degree
murder? Under Minnesota law, a person guilty of attempted first
degree murder may be sentenced to a maximum term of twenty
years.127 The vendor, who may be merely bragging about his ability
to supply ten grams of crack, faces thirty years imprisonment and his
crime was to speak words.
Any number of constitutional challenges could be made here. To
punish a person with a thirty year penalty on the basis of words
spoken may constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the eighth amendment.128 Due process, equal protection and fourth
amendment probable cause challenges could be fashioned without
too much difficulty. In short, it is doubtful that the State could
constitutionally send anyone to prison for thirty years based on the
level of culpability to be found in a mere offer.
The Minnesota Legislature should consider removing the words
"offer and agrees" from the definition of "sell." Solicitation should
not be keyed to the graduated structure of sale crimes. If an
undercover officer really suspects that the person offering drugs for
sale has the actual capacity to deliver the drugs, all the officer needs
to do is wait until the drugs are delivered before making an arrest.
At that point, the officer can charge the vendor with an actual sale.
126. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 5.1, 5.2, at
247-53 (1985). Entrapment may occur where law enforcement authorities have gone
to improper lengths to encourage another to commit a crime, or where it is found to
be unlikely that the crime would have been committed without that encouragement.
Id.
127. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1988) (imprisonment for life for first degree
murder); MINN. STAT. § 609.17, subd. 4(1) (1988) (when conviction is for the attempt
of a crime, and the underlying crime sets forth a penalty of life imprisonment, the
penalty for the attempt is up to 20 years).
128. For a review of some cases dealing with length of sentence and cruel and
unusual punishment, see Annotation, Length of Sentence as Violation of Constitutional
Provisions Prohibiting Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 A.L.R. 3d 335 (1970).
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In short, the vendor should be allowed to show, through his action
or inaction, just how culpable he really is.
Solicitation could be made an independent crime in much the
same manner as prostitution is now. One statute should contain
both the behavior prohibited and the penalty to be imposed. Such a
law would probably withstand constitutional challenge if the penalty
is not unreasonable. In determining that penalty, the legislature
should focus on the harms discussed above. Solicitations harm
because they induce others to engage in crime and they may also
cause a public nuisance. The penalty for solicitation should not
address any other harm. If the vendor goes beyond soliciting to
actual delivering, existing laws already address the greater harm that
has come into play.
E. Minnesota Statutes Section 609.195, Subdivision b,
and Third Degree Murder
On March 5, 1982, popular comedian and movie starJohn Belushi
died from an overdose of cocaine and heroin. A woman named
Cathy Smith admitted preparing and administering the fatal injec-
tion.129 If these events took place today in Minnesota, Ms. Smith
could be charged with murder. Minnesota Statutes section 609.195,
subdivision b,13o passed by the legislature in 1987, states: "Whoever,
without intent to cause death, proximately causes the death of a
human being by, directly or indirectly, unlawfully selling, giving
away, bartering, delivering, exchanging, distributing, or administer-
ing a controlled substance.. . is guilty of murder in the third degree
"131
Before the passage of this statute, prosecutions for this type of
crime were conducted under Minnesota's felony murder statute,
Minnesota Statutes section 609.19(2).132 Felony murder charges tra-
ditionally involve the situation where a person has caused the death
of another while the person was in the course of committing some
underlying felony offense.lSS The Minnesota Supreme Court has
noted that the purpose of the felony-murder rule is to "isolate for
special treatment those felonies that involve some special danger to
human life."34 The felony act of administering illegal drugs could
therefore create liability for murder, notwithstanding the probability
129. See B. WOODWARD, WIRED 476 (1984).
130. MINN. STAT. § 609.195, subd. b (Supp. 1989).
131. Id.
132. MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subd. 2 (1988).
133. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 123, at § 7.5, at 206-11.
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that the act was performed without intent to kill or malice. It is the
indifference to the underlying "special danger" that matters.
In Minnesota, there have been at least two prosecutions under the
felony murder rule involving drug overdose deaths. In State v.
Forsman,l3 5 a defendant who injected heroin into the body of a per-
son who later died as a result of that injection was convicted of mur-
der. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding
that it was the act of injection that brought the crime within the fel-
ony murder rule.136
In State v. Aarsvold,13 7 the defendant sold cocaine to the decedent.
It was unclear whether the defendant actually helped the decedent
inject himself with the drug. The issue before the Minnesota Court
of Appeals was whether the defendant, assuming he could prove he
did not help with the injection, could still be liable for murder based
on the act of selling cocaine to the decedent. In the opinion of the
court, the deciding factors were the nature of cocaine and the legisla-
ture's intent. The court stated:
Because the sale of cocaine alone does not justify the assumption
that the purchaser is incurring a substantial and unjustified risk of
death, we hold that sale alone is not a proper felony upon which to
predicate a charge of felony murder. To hold otherwise would give
the felony-murder statute a broader scope that this court will im-
pute in the absence of clear legislative intent to effectuate that
meaning. 13 8
With Forsman and Aarsvold, the Minnesota appellate courts sus-
tained the charge of murder where the defendant had actually partic-
ipated in administering a drug, but did not sustain the charge where
the defendant only sold the drug. The Minnesota Legislature
wanted the charge of murder to apply in both circumstances. Minne-
sota Statutes section 609.195, subdivision b, was passed to accom-
plish this. According to one sponsor of the bill that led to the new
law, "the purpose of the [proposed] statute is to extend [the charge
of murder] to the sale of a controlled substance where the sale
causes the death of a human being."13 9
With the passage of Minnesota Statutes section 609.195, subdivi-
sion b, the legislature has probably succeeded in extending the
charge of murder to the drug sale and overdose situation. Drug
overdose murder is now treated under specially defined circum-
135. 260 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1977).
136. See id. at 163-65.
137. 376 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
138. Id. at 522 (footnote omitted).
139. Remarks of Ray Schmitz, Olmstead County Attorney, during the House
Crime and.Family Law Division meeting, Mar. 30, 1987, on the hearings for H.F. 350,
discussing a proposed extension of murder to drug sale crimes that result in death
(tape on file at the Minnesota Legislative Reference Library).
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stances apart from the felony murder rule. Thus, the Minnesota ap-
pellate courts will not have any legislative intent problems similar to
those in Aarsvold.
One interesting question raised by the new law is why the words
"proximately causes" were included in the statute. This is the only
homicide statute that refers to proximate cause instead of just plain
"cause." Perhaps legislators thought this language would further
clarify their intention that sale crimes provide the basis for murder.
Whatever the reason, the effect of the words "proximately causes" at
trial should be no different than if the word "cause" alone had been
used. To see why this is so, consider the fictional trial of Cathy Smith
in Minnesota. 140
Defense counsel at closing argument:
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we freely admit that Cathy
Smith gave John Belushi the drugs that killed him that night. We
freely admit that Cathy Smith, a heroin addict and drug dealer, was
no picture of virtue. But, you have also seen that she cared for John
Belushi in some ways, expressed affection for him. The last thing she
wanted that night was for John to die.141
"And ladies and gentlemen, who really killed John Belushi? We
have shown that John Belushi was completely unable to ever turn
down an opportunity to consume drugs. Six years before his death,
one of his doctors wrote in Belushi's file:
Smokes 3 packs a day
Alcohol drinks socially
Medications: Valium occasionally
Marijuana 4 to 5 times a week
Cocaine-snort daily, main habit
Mescaline-regularly




"We have shown you that by the time of his death, Mr. Belushi was
in fact a heavy user of heroin.14 3 You also heard from the doctor
who saw Belushi briefly in 1979 and was so struck by Belushi's drug
habit that the doctor later told studio executives to "get as many
140. This fictional portrayal draws upon facts presented in Bob Woodward's book
Wired.
141. Defense counsel should be able to discuss the subject of intent before the
jury even though intent is not an element of the crime. See State v. Blank, 352
N.W.2d 91 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The court held evidence of a victim's provocation
in assault trial is admissible. Although provocation was not a defense to the charge,
the court stated, "Lawsuits are not tried in a vacuum." Id.
142. B. WOODWARD, supra note 129, at 111 (account of Dr. Rosenbluth).
143. See, e.g., id. at 415-76 (detailing Belushi's use of heroin).
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movies out of him as possible, because he has only two to three years
to live."1 44
"Ladies and gentlemen, John Belushi got drugs from more people
than we will ever know. It is as if Cathy Smith's name was drawn
from a hat. It just happened to be her who supplied the drugs that
killed him. Does this sound like murder to you?"
Defense counsel's theory of the case is that John Belushi "caused"
his own death. If the charge had read "cause" instead of "proximate
cause," the jury might well have used a "but for" analysis in its delib-
erations. But for the acts of Cathy Smith, would John Belushi have
died? If the jury accepts defense counsel's argument that Belushi
was destined to find a way to kill himself, then they may very well
acquit Ms. Smith, or perhaps convict her of a lesser charge.
Does the jury consider the proximate causation issue any differ-
ently from a plain causation issue? If the current civil law treatment
of proximate cause is referred to, the answer is probably no. In Min-
nesota civil cases, the word "proximate" becomes the word "direct"
when an instruction is read to thejury.145 Thejury may be told that
direct cause is established when an act is shown to have been a "sub-
stantial factor" in bringing about the result giving rise to the
charge.146 A jury might well believe, therefore, that given John Be-
lushi's self destructive behavior, the acts of Cathy Smith did not con-
stitute a substantial factor in bringing about his death. Thus, in a
case involving the death of a heavy drug abuser, the "proximately
causes" language in Minnesota Statutes section 609.195, subdivision
b, probably brings about no major change in the way ajury considers
the issue of causation.
A final matter involving the drug overdose murder charge de-
serves brief consideration. The legislature has structured Minnesota
Statutes section 609.195, subdivision b, so that lack of intent or lack
of malice are irrelevant to the charge. If the proper case arises, de-
fense counsel should argue that there must be a limit on the legisla-
ture's power to make these factors irrelevant.
Consider the case of State v. Patrick.14 7 The Patrick defendant got
drunk and went driving. Then, the
appellant drove at speeds in excess of 60 miles per hour on resi-
dential streets. He nearly collided head-on with a car carrying a
144. See id. at 5 (Report from Dr. Braun to Producer Robert Weiss).
145. See MINN. CIV. JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, CIVIL 3D JIG# 140, at 113 (1986);
see also Gardner v. Germain, 264 Minn. 61, 65-66, 117 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Minn. 1962)
("direct" is preferable to "proximate" because the latter word may confuse the
jurors).
146. See MINN. CIV. JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, CIVIL 3D JIG #140, at 113 (1986);
see also Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 1980) (use of "substantial factor" test).
147. 358 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
1990]
39
Leavenworth: Illegal Drugs, New Laws, and Justice: An Examination of Five Rece
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
woman and her two children. Appellant forced two pedestrians off
a road, turned around, and chased them off the road a second time
for fun traveling 60 miles per hour.
When the police began to pursue appellant, he decided to out-
run them driving up to 80 miles per houir on residential streets. He
ran a police roadblock at high speed, nearly striking a patrol car
that had to move to avoid a collision. Appellant ran several stop
signs and eventually struck a car, killing the driver. 14 8
The Patrick defendant was convicted of third degree murder, the
same level of murder that Cathy Smith would have been charged
with under Minnesota Statutes section 609.195, subdivision b. Ms.
Smith's level of culpability, however, does not begin to compare with
that of the Patrick defendant. The defendant in Patrick could almost
be certain that he was going to kill or injure someone. The person
who occasionally sells or shares drugs is unlikely to ever be so cer-
tain, as the risk of death, while present, is much lower.
The point, then, is that intent, foreseeability, and malice ought to
play a role in the way drug overdose murder convictions are ob-
tained.t49 Although the fatal drug overdose scenario may present
facts which express the essence of pathetic human behavior, that may
not be enough of a reason to ignore traditional measures of culpabil-
ity, especially when the charge is murder. Defense lawyers should be
prepared to make the appropriate challenges to the court.
CONCLUSION
On most any day, the heavy toll of illegal drug activity is made
apparent in the morning newspaper. The drug-related murders, as-
saults, and burglaries are written about; there are stories about drug
overdose deaths and infants experiencing the pangs of withdrawal
from drug addiction-addiction caused by the mother's drug abuse.
Given this reality, government would be irresponsible if it did not
take action.
With respect to the quick enactment of drug laws, the main pur-
pose of this Note has been to show that this well-intentioned remedy
may itself cause unintended tragedies. The conviction of the inno-
cent, the seizure of property from the innocent, the imposition of
unduly harsh sentences-Minnesota's new drug laws may encourage
all of these results.
Since "[t]he interest of the United States in a criminal prosecution
'is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done,' "150
perhaps it is time to carefully examine Minnesota's new laws to be
148. Id. at 427-28.
149. For a discussion on legislative power to disregard intent, see supra notes
80-114 and accompanying text.
150. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957) (citation omitted).
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certain that justice is being served. There is justice when the illegal
drug dealer goes to prison. There is travesty when the innocent go
there too. No law should give short shrift to the latter result, not
even in the furtherance of a war on drugs.
Philip Leavenworth
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